Bodily self‐relatedness in vicarious touch is reflected at early cortical processing stages by Adler, Julia & Gillmeister, Helge
Bodily self-relatedness in vicarious touch 
 
1 
Bodily self-relatedness in vicarious touch is 
reflected at early cortical processing stages 
 
Julia Adler1 and Helge Gillmeister2  
 
1 Department of Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy, University Medical 
Center Mainz, Germany 
2 Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Colchester, UK  
 
 
Corresponding author: 
Helge Gillmeister 
Department of Psychology 
University of Essex 
Wivenhoe Park 
Colchester CO3 3DX 
E-Mail: helge@essex.ac.uk 
 
  
Bodily self-relatedness in vicarious touch 
 
2 
Abstract 
Studies have suggested that there is a strong link between the bodily self and 
the mechanisms underlying vicarious representations. Here we used 
somatosensory event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the temporal 
dynamics of vicarious touch for stimuli that are more or less related to one’s own 
body (human hands vs. rubber gloves). We found that vicarious touch effects 
were restricted to self-relatable events (human hands) at early, implicit stages 
of somatosensory processing (P45). At later, more cognitive stages of processing 
(late positive complex, LPC), the vicarious touch effect was stronger for self-
relatable events (touch on human hands) than non-self-relatable events (touch 
on rubber gloves), but present for both. Both effects, but especially the vicarious 
touch effect for human hands at P45, were stronger in individuals with higher 
levels of interoceptive awareness. Our results confirm that there is a tight link 
between vicarious touch and the bodily self, and characterise P45 effects of 
vicarious touch as its likely neural basis. We propose that vicarious processes 
and the embodied self may be representationally indistinct (linked in a common 
neural representation) at early, implicit somatosensory processing stages. 
 
Key words: somatosensory, ERPs, vicarious touch, mirror touch, embodied self, 
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1. Introduction 
Vicarious touch (‘mirror touch’) is the automatic simulation of touch observed on 
another person’s body. It is linked to the activation of a broad somatosensory 
cortical network during the visual perception of tactile sensations (for reviews 
see Gillmeister, Bowling, Rigato, & Banissy, 2017; Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 
2010). From a developmental perspective, early imitative (mirroring) 
experiences involving multiple bodily senses enable both the motoric and the 
emotional attunement between infants and their primary caregivers, which is 
thought to be crucial for the emergence of our basic bodily sense of self (e.g., 
Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; Legrand, 2006; Rochat & Striano, 2000; see also 
Blanke, Slater, & Serino, 2015). This basic sense of self is the foundation for the 
developing ability to represent ourselves (and others) as mental agents 
(“mentalising”) (e.g. Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007; see also Markova & 
Legerstee, 2006; Stern, 1995). In other words, our social being is based on 
mirroring - an intuitive bodily resonance with others (Fuchs & Koch, 2014; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962). 
Given its developmental origins, it seems fitting that the neurophysiological 
underpinnings of vicarious experiences lie in the sensorimotor systems related to 
matching externally perceived (e.g. visual) and internally experienced 
(sensorimotor, affective) events (the broader mirror neuron system; see 
Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012). Indeed, fMRI studies have 
shown that the visual observation of touch gives rise, not only to activity in 
somatosensory cortices (SI and SII), but also to associated activity in 
frontoparietal mirroring networks, self–other distinction networks, and insula 
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(see Bufalari & Ionta, 2013; Gillmeister et al., 2017; Keysers et al., 2010 for 
reviews).  
In line with the developmental view that mirroring shapes the sense of self, 
vicarious touch in adults results in stronger behavioural responses when there is 
greater self-relatedness (Cardini, Costantini, Galati, Romani, Làdavas et al., 
2011; Cardini, Tajadura-Jimenez, Serino, & Tsakiris, 2013; Serino, Pizzoferrato, 
& Làdavas, 2008; Serino, Giovagnoli, & Làdavas, 2009), as well as in earlier ERP 
effects when viewing touch on one’s own face compared to that of another 
person (Adler, Schabinger, Michal, Beutel, & Gillmeister, 2016). Self-relatedness 
can be experienced for stimuli that are associated with one’s own self, or 
specifically with one’s own body (e.g. one’s own face vs. face of another person) 
or for stimuli that are more “like” one’s one body (e.g. a human face vs. an 
inanimate object).  
An additional route to experiencing self-relatedness lies within the observer 
himself, that is, how closely attached to their own body a person feels (the 
embodied self). An example of a psychological condition that is characterised by 
a lack of such an attachment is depersonalisation (e.g. Simeon, 2004). The 
disrupted relationship with one’s own bodily self is expressed as, for example, 
feeling detached from body parts or the whole body, looking in the mirror and 
feeling estranged from one’s image, and not feeling in control of one’s 
movements (e.g. Sierra, Baker, Medford, & David, 2005; Sierra & Berrios, 2000; 
Sierra & David, 2011; Simeon, 2004). Depersonalisation occurs not only in 
mental illness, but can also be found as temporary symptoms within the general 
population, for example following severe stress or trauma (e.g. Charbonneau & 
O’Connor, 1999; Simeon, 2004; Trueman, 1984). 
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It could be argued that the strength of the individual’s attachment to their bodily 
self drives the degree to which external stimuli are experienced as self-related. 
This entails that a weaker attachment to one’s bodily self (e.g., in 
depersonalisation) should be associated with experiencing external stimuli (e.g., 
seeing one’s own face) as less self-related. We showed this in our earlier study 
(Adler et al., 2016), where we used ERPs to measure the time course of 
vicarious touch while participants observed their own and others’ faces. Vicarious 
touch effects were present at an early somatosensory cortical processing stage 
(P45) but only when observing one’s own face. Importantly, this effect was 
absent for individuals who reported frequently feeling detached from their own 
body and self (symptoms of depersonalisation). In contrast to the P45, later, 
more cognitive ERP components (P200), were less selectively associated with 
the degree of self-relatedness. While early and late processes may work 
together to enable the interaction between visual and tactile bodily information, 
our findings suggest that P45 is the most specific index of bodily self-relatedness 
in vicarious touch that can be measured with ERPs to mechanical tactile stimuli.  
 
Other findings within the literature appear to fit well with this idea. Effects of 
vicarious touch at P45 have been shown in study designs likely to elicit feelings 
of self-relatedness by showing touch on hands seen in a first-person perspective 
(Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di Russo, & Aglioti, 2007; Martinez-Jauand, 
Gonzalez-Roldan, Munoz, Sitges, Cifre et al., 2012; Deschrijver et al., 2015). 
Since P45 is likely to reflect neural activity in S1 (Allison, McCarthy, Wood, 
Williamson, & Spencer, 1989; Allison, McCarthy & Wood, 1992; Schubert, Ritter, 
Wüstenberg, Preuschof, Curio et al., 2008), it is no surprise that SI is itself 
Bodily self-relatedness in vicarious touch 
 
6 
modulated by vicarious touch (e.g. Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 
2005; see Keysers et al., 2010 for a review). Vicarious touch in SI is strongly 
affected by the perspective of the viewed hand (Schaefer, Xu, Flor, & Cohen, 
2009; Schaefer, Heinze & Rotte, 2012), and in line with this, a recent study 
(Rigato, Bremner, Gillmeister, & Banissy, 2019) also reports that the perspective 
of the viewed hand modulates vicarious touch responses over P45. 
The present study aimed to substantiate the idea that vicarious touch effects at 
P45 are a neuronal index of bodily self-relatedness. To this end we aimed to 
extend our previous findings by investigating the time course of cortical vicarious 
touch effects in response to stimuli differing in self-relatedness (touch on human 
hands vs. rubber gloves), and in relation to observers’ individual levels of 
interoceptive abilities and mentalising. Interoception is the awareness of our 
internal, physiological processes, such as our heartbeat (Craig, 2002). Individual 
levels of this ability are positively related to own body-awareness (Tsakiris, 
Tajadura-Jimenez, & Costantini, 2011), negatively related to feeling dissociated 
from one’s body (Mehling, Price, Daubenmier, Acree, Bartmess et al., 2012), and 
may thus be an indication of the strength of the second route to experiencing 
self-relatedness (the embodied self). Further, one might argue that both a 
stronger sense of bodily self and stronger mentalising abilities are associated 
with stronger vicarious representations. This is because mirroring interactions 
during early childhood are not only crucial for the development of the basic 
sense of bodily self, but also enable an affective reciprocity between infants and 
caregivers, which is thought to be the basis for mentalising (e.g., Fonagy et al., 
2007). In line with this, vicarious representations in S1 / at P45 have previously 
also been associated with individual levels of empathy, specifically with 
perspective-taking (Bolognini, Rossetti, Convento, & Vallar, 2013; Bolognini, 
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Rossetti, Fusaro, Vallar, & Miniussi, 2014; Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 
2006; Martinez-Jauand et al., 2012; Schaefer et al., 2012).  
 
Therefore, the strongest self-relatedness in the present study can be 
assumed during the observation of touch on a human hand (vs. rubber gloves) 
in observers who have better interoceptive and mentalising abilities (vs. weaker 
abilities). Thus, we expected the strongest effects of vicarious touch at early 
processing stages (P45) for these viewing conditions and individuals. In addition 
to these early processes, we expected further, less selective effects at later, 
cognitive components (late positive complex, LPC, including P200, P300 and 
subsequent waveforms). Since these components reflect a variety of different 
operations, we may expect effects of self-relatedness (see Adler et al., 2016; 
Deschrijver, Wiersema, & Brass, 2015) or self-other distinction (Longo, Musil, & 
Haggard, 2012; Knyazev, 2013), as well as more general congruency effects due 
to the mismatch between visual and tactile stimulation (see Deschrijver et al., 
2015; Kok, 2001; Polich, 2007).  
Similar to Adler et al. (2016), we used the tactile mirroring paradigm, 
where observers receive tactile stimuli on their own, hidden body while viewing 
another person's body being touched or not touched at the same time. As 
mirroring entails an internal simulation of the observed event, a match between 
the representations of the felt and the seen stimulus should be present when 
viewing touch but not when viewing no touch. Thus, vicarious touch effects are 
defined as differences in somatosensory processing between touch and no-touch 
conditions. 
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2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of 46 healthy adults (21 men; 1 left-handed) with a mean 
age of 23.3 years (SD: 5.7 years). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
The study was conducted at the University of Essex in accordance with the 2008 
Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee. Informed written consent was obtained from each participant prior 
to testing. 
 
2. 2. Materials and Apparatus 
For the ERP task, we presented visual stimuli (grey-scaled images of human 
hands or rubber gloves, see Figure 1), which measured 6.1° of horizontal and 
3.4° of vertical visual angle and were presented against a white background in 
the centre of a computer screen. Mean luminosity of the images was adjusted to 
match across stimulus categories. A rubber glove was chosen for its low-level 
visual similarity with human hands, with the open end of the glove clearly visible 
to ensure that participants could be certain that the glove was not worn by a 
human hand.  
Neutral images showed a left or right human hand or rubber glove in a prone 
position with a pencil above it (see Figure 1). Touch images showed the pencil 
lower down, depressing the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle of the human 
hand (Figure 1, upper timeline) or the equivalent location of the rubber hand 
(Figure 1, lower timeline). No-touch images showed the pencil next to the hand, 
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in a position chosen so that the perceived distance travelled by the pencil would 
be similar across touch and no-touch trials.  
 ---------------------------- 
Figure 1 here 
---------------------------- 
A tactile controller (Heijo Research Electronics, London, UK) and mechanical 
solenoid stimulators (M&E Solve, Rochester, Kent, UK) delivered suprathreshold 
taps by pushing a blunt plastic tip against the participant’s skin whenever a 
current was passed through the solenoid. Taps were delivered to the FDI muscle 
of the participants’ left or right hand during the presentation of each touch or 
no-touch image. White noise was played through in-ear headphones to mask 
solenoid sounds. 
Additionally, we investigated perspective taking / mentalising abilities and 
interoception in four different tasks. We used one perspective taking self-report 
survey and one mentalising task, one task of interoceptive sensitivity, and one 
self-report survey of interoceptive awareness.  
The perspective taking survey was the perspective-taking subscale of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983), previously used to 
demonstrate links between empathy and vicarious representations including 
touch (Bolognini et al., 2013, 2014; Gazzola et al., 2006; Schaefer et al., 2012). 
This subscale consisted of seven statements such as “I sometimes try to 
understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective”, scored on a 6-point Likert scale from 0 (Does not describe me well) 
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to 5 (Describes me very well). All scores were added to compute each person’s 
perspective-taking score (0 to 35). 
The mentalising task was a theory of mind (ToM) task (Kinderman, 
Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998; Rutherford, 2004). Participants were asked to carefully 
read three complex social scenarios, the understanding of which required 
participants to take the described people’s perspective. The scenarios were 
chosen from among the four multiply embedded false belief problems used by 
Rutherford (2004). After reading each scenario, and without looking at the text 
again, participants were asked to indicate which of two slightly different 
statements about the scenario was true. There were 5 pairs of statements. Four 
of these were theory of mind statements, requiring the participant to represent 
up to four nested levels of representations of the mental contents of the people 
described (e.g., the 4th-order statement “Simon hoped Jim would believe that 
Susan thought Edward wanted to (vs. did not want to) marry Betty”). The 
remaining statement pair was a 4th-order nested non-ToM question, which did 
not require mentalising to assess the contribution of general understanding and 
memory of embedded relationships on performance (e.g., “The girl whose car 
Simon works on practices dance with the person who is a loan officer (vs. 
computer consultant) in Edward’s bank”). One of the scenarios contained an 
additional 3rd-order ToM question (see Rutherford, 2004). Accuracy at each of 
the four levels of mentalising was computed for each scenario and then 
averaged across the scenarios (0 to 1). Accuracy for to the 4th-order non-ToM 
questions was also computed in this way (0 to 1). 
To measure interoceptive sensitivity, we used a heartbeat counting task 
(Schandry, 1981). Participants silently counted their heartbeat in 30-second 
intervals, while a small pulse oximeter attached to the index finger of their left 
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hand and shielded from view monitored the blood oxygen concentration and 
changes in blood volume in the skin (photoplethysmography), and displayed the 
participant’s pulse (heartbeats per minute) in real time. Our measure of 
interoceptive sensitivity was the difference between participant-reported and 
oximeter-based scores, averaged across two instances of the counting task to 
obtain a more robust estimate (e.g., Wittkamp, Bertsch, Vögele, & Schulz, 
2018). 
Finally, to test interoceptive awareness, participants completed the 
Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA; Mehling et al., 
2012), comprising of a 32-item list of statements such as “I listen for 
information from my body about my emotional state”, scored on a 6-point Likert 
scale ranging from 0 (This never applies to me on a daily basis) to 5 (This 
always applies to me on a daily basis). The MAIA assesses interoceptive 
awareness across eight dimensions: noticing, not-distracting, not-worrying, 
attention regulation, emotion awareness, self-regulation, body listening, and 
trusting. These eight dimensions are sorted into five separate categories (see 
Table 1). Scores for all statements pertaining to each of the eight dimension 
were averaged (0 to 5).  
---------------------------- 
Table 1 here 
---------------------------- 
2. 3. Procedure 
Before the EEG task, participants completed two instances of the 
heartbeat counting task, one at the start of the session, and one after 
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completing all other questionnaires. They were instructed to close their eyes, 
focus inward and on their own heartbeats. They were asked to count their 
heartbeats in a time period defined by two beeps from a timer, one at the start 
of the interval and one at the end.  The experimenter noted down all pulse 
values that were measured during the counting interval (30 seconds), which 
were averaged after the experiment. The number of heartbeats reported by the 
participant was doubled to convert it to beats-per-minute for each 30-second 
interval and subtracted from the measured pulse (absolute rather than signed 
difference) to obtain the counting error. The counting error was divided by the 
pulse to obtain a heartbeat perception score between 0 and 1, and this score 
was averaged across the two instances of the heartbeat counting tasks as a 
measure of interoceptive sensitivity (see e.g. Pollatos et al., 2008).  
Between the two heartbeat counting tasks, participants completed the IRI 
perspective-taking subscale, the MAIA and the ToM task.  
For the EEG task, participants were told to observe the visual stimuli 
carefully, focusing on the part of the hand that may be touched, and to silently 
count any double touches they saw, regardless of whether they were delivered 
to the human hand or to the rubber glove. The counting task was used to ensure 
that participants attended to the visual stimuli. They were also told that they 
could ignore felt taps on their own hands as these were irrelevant to the 
counting task. 
As shown in Figure 1, each experimental trial started with the neutral 
stimulus (hand with pencil above it) for 1000 ms. Then, the touch or no-touch 
stimulus appeared for 200ms, accompanied by a 200-ms tap to the participant's 
hand. This was followed by the neutral stimulus again for 800ms, giving the 
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visual impression of brief pencil movement to touch the hand (touch), or the 
surface next to the hand (no-touch). Between trials (ITI), a blank screen was 
shown for a random interval between 500 and 1000 ms. 
 In counting trials (double touch; not shown in Figure 1), we presented the 
visual touch or no-touch stimulus twice (e.g. 200ms touch, 100ms neutral, 
200ms touch, 800ms neutral), giving the visual impression of two brief pencil 
movements to touch the hand. Only the second visual touch or no-touch 
stimulus was accompanied by the tactile stimulus. 
There were 7 blocks of 60 trials, consisting of 48 experimental trials and 
12 drawn from a list containing both experimental and counting trials, such that 
counting trials could be any number up to 12 per block. Half of all trials showed 
a human hand, and the other half a rubber glove; half showed touch stimuli, the 
other half showed no-touch stimuli. Half of the images showed touch on the left 
hand, the other half showed touch on the right hand, and half were accompanied 
by felt touch on the same hand as the viewed hand, while the other half were 
accompanied by felt touch on the other hand (see Adler et al., 2016). This was 
done to control specular and anatomical congruency between viewed and felt 
touch, as the literature on bimodal visual-tactile neurons in monkey parietal 
cortex (e.g. Ishida, Nakajima, Inase, & Murata, 2010) and on mirror-touch 
synaesthesia (e.g. Banissy & Ward, 2013) has reported both specular and 
anatomical (as well as bilateral or central) matching between viewed and felt 
touch. Therefore, each participant saw at least 84 trials of each critical condition, 
that is, each combination of viewed hand (human hand or rubber glove) and 
touch (touch or no touch stimuli) (see ERP analysis). All trial types were 
presented in equal proportions and in random order. 
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Between blocks, participants received feedback about the accuracy of 
their counting, and were encouraged to pay better attention if necessary. 
 
2. 4. EEG recording, ERP analysis and correlations 
EEG was recorded with BrainVision actiCHamp from FP1, TP9, TP10, FC5, 
FC3, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC4, FC6, C5, C3, C1, CZ, C2, C4, C6, CP5, CP3, CP1, CPZ, 
CP2, CP4, and CP6 (subset of the international 10-10 system), using actiCAP 
active scalp electrodes (BrainProducts GmbH, Gilching, Germany). This subset of 
electrodes were selected on the basis of the expected cortical distribution of 
somatosensory components over sensorimotor and anterior parietal cortices.  
EEG was amplified, band-pass filtered at 0.01 – 100 Hz, and digitised at 500 Hz. 
Off-line pre-processing of EEG signals was done using BrainVision Analyzer 2 
(BrainProducts GmbH, Gilching, Germany). Signals were filtered with a low-pass 
Butterworth filter of 30 Hz (12 dB slope), referenced to the average of the 
mastoids (TP9 and TP10), epoched for a period from 100 ms before to 400 ms 
after the onset of the tactile stimulus, and baseline-corrected using the 100-ms 
window preceding stimulus onset. Trials with eye blinks or other artefacts (ie., a 
voltage exceeding ± 100 µV at any electrode relative to the 100-ms pre-stimulus 
baseline) measured in this interval were excluded from analysis (5% of trials for 
each critical condition on average; see below). 
ERPs to tactile stimuli were averaged for all combinations of observed 
touch (touch vs. no-touch) and observed hand (human hand vs. rubber glove), 
collapsing over left and right touched and viewed hand conditions per 
hemisphere. This is, we collapsed over left and right hand touched hands by re-
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coding electrodes as either contralateral (electrode over hemisphere 
contralateral to the touched hand, regardless of viewed hand) or ipsilateral 
(electrodes over hemisphere ipsilateral to the touched hand, regardless of 
viewed hand). ERP mean amplitudes were computed for measurement windows 
over contralateral somatosensory component P45 (35-55 ms post-stimulus 
onset) and the bilateral frontocentral late positive complex (LPC, 220-380 ms). 
Measurement windows were selected on the basis of grandaveraged ERPs 
collapsed over all experimental conditions, and were centred around the peak of 
the P45 and the descending flank of the P200 (LPC). Within these measurement 
windows statistical analyses of ERP mean amplitudes were conducted for lateral 
somatosensory cortical electrodes FC3/4, FC5/6, C3/4, C5/6, CP3/4, and CP5/6, 
contralaterally for contralateral component P45 and bilaterally for the LPC. These 
electrodes were chosen because the grand averaged waveform collapsed over all 
conditions showed somatosensory components to be present and maximal here, 
relative to more medial sites (see also Figure 2 for voltage maxima in P45 and 
LPC time windows). Similar electrode selections can be found in other ERP 
studies of vicarious touch (e.g., Adler et al., 2016; Bufalari et al., 2007; 
Martinez-Jauand et al., 2012; Rigato et al., 2019). 
Effects of touch observation and stimulus category were tested with 
repeated-measures ANOVAs for the within-subject factors observed touch (touch 
vs. no-touch), observed hand (human hand vs. rubber glove), and electrode 
(see above) for contralateral component P45. ANOVAs for bilateral LPC included 
the additional within-subject factor hemisphere (contralateral vs. ipsilateral). 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections to the degrees of freedom were applied where 
appropriate. 
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Bayesian probabilities associated with the occurrence of the null 
hypothesis (H0|D) and the experimental hypothesis (H1|D) were calculated 
alongside standard statistics to allow for clearer inferences about the 
probabilities of both significant and nonsignificant effects in our data (see 
Masson, 2011). These probabilities range from 0 (no evidence) to 1 (very strong 
evidence for null or experimental hypothesis). 
Relationships between somatosensory ERP effects of touch observation, 
perspective-taking / mentalising and interoception were tested with Pearson’s 
correlations. Correction for multiple correlations was applied using the method 
described by Benjamini & Hochberg (1995), which controls the false discovery 
rate. 
 
3. Results 
During the EEG task, participants missed between 0 and 1 of the double touches 
per block on average (mean: 0.22, SD: 0.28), showing that they paid sufficient 
attention to the visual stimuli.  
 
3. 1. Somatosensory ERPs 
Figure 3 below shows somatosensory ERPs to touch on the hand when viewing 
touch and no touch images of human hands and rubber gloves over contralateral 
and ipsilateral electrodes. Vicarious touch can be defined as a voltage difference 
between touch and no touch observation conditions. It can be seen that there 
were effects of vicarious touch over P45 and the LPC (see Figure 2 for a 
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comparison of the scalp distributions of the components and the effects of 
vicarious touch). Over P45, viewing touch on a human hand gave rise to a 
greater positivity compared to viewing no touch. This P45 effect of vicarious 
touch was absent when a rubber glove was viewed. Viewing touch also gave rise 
to smaller LPCs than viewing no touch and this difference appeared more 
pronounced when viewing human hands than rubber gloves. 
---------------------------- 
Figure 2 here 
---------------------------- 
---------------------------- 
Figure 3 here 
---------------------------- 
 
These observations were confirmed in ANOVAs for early and late 
components. For P45 there was a significant two-way interaction between 
observed touch and observed hand (F(1,45) = 8.4, p = .006, partial η² = .16, 
p(H1|D) > .88), regardless of electrode (F(5,225) = 1.1, p = .362, partial η² = 
.02, p(H0|D) > .99). Follow-up ANOVAs for each level of observed hand showed 
that differences between touch condition and no-touch condition were present 
for human hands (F(1,45) = 9.8, p = .003, partial η² = .18, p(H1|D) > .93), but 
not for rubber gloves (F(1,45) < 1, p = .363, partial η² = .02, p(H0|D) > .82). 
Comparing the two observed hand conditions (human hand vs. rubber glove) in 
follow-up ANOVAs, we found that differences between human hands and rubber 
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gloves were present when touch was observed (F(1,45) = 5.4, p = .025, partial 
η² = .11, p(H1|D) > .65), but not for the no touch condition (F(1,45) = 1.7, p = 
.194, partial η² = .04, p(H0|D) > .74). There were no other significant 
interactions with observed touch in these analyses. There were also no main 
effects of observed touch (F(1,45) = 2.0, p = .164, partial η² = .04, p(H0|D) > 
.71) or observed hand (F(1,45) < 1, p = .420, partial η² = .02, p(H0|D) > .82).  
Altogether this shows that there were vicarious touch effects at early, 
implicit stages of somatosensory processing, shown as larger P45 amplitudes 
during the visual observation of touch relative to no touch. This P45 vicarious 
touch effect was restricted to human hands; it did not occur when a visually 
similar object (rubber glove) was touched. The vicarious representation is likely 
to be associated with a neuronal enhancement of tactile processing during the 
touch condition, specifically. This is because closer inspection showed that the 
touch condition, but not the no-touch condition, contained evidence of an 
enhancement of P45 amplitudes for the observation of human hands compared 
to rubber gloves.  
For the LPC, similar to the P45, the interaction between observed touch 
and observed hand was significant (F(1,45) = 8.3, p = .006, partial η² = .16, 
p(H1|D) > .87), suggesting that vicarious touch effects in this time range were 
sensitive to whether human hands or rubber gloves were viewed, with stronger 
effects for human hands than rubber gloves. Follow-up ANOVAs for each level of 
observed hand showed that effects of observed touch were present for both 
human hands (F(1,45) = 54.5, p < .001, partial η² = .55, p(H1|D) > .99) and 
rubber gloves (F(1,45) = 22.1, p < .001, partial η² = .33, p(H1|D) > .99). For 
human hands, there was also a significant interaction between observed touch 
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and electrode (F(5,225) = 20.0, p < .001, partial η² = .31, p(H1|D)>.99). 
Pairwise comparisons of the estimated marginal means of the factor observed 
touch at all levels of electrode revealed that there were significant effects of 
observed touch at all electrodes (F(1,45) > 38.0, p < .001, partial η² > .45).  
For rubber gloves, there were significant interactions between observed 
touch and electrode, observed touch and hemisphere, and observed touch, 
hemisphere and electrode (F(5,225) > 3.1, p < .014, partial η² > .06, 
p(H1|D)>.99). Pairwise comparisons of the estimated marginal means of the 
factor observed touch at all levels of hemisphere and electrode revealed that 
there were significant effects of observed touch at all electrodes (F(1,45) > 8.9, 
p < .007, partial η² > .15).  
Comparing the two observed hand conditions (human hand versus rubber 
glove) in follow-up ANOVAs, we found that differences between human hands 
and rubber gloves were present when touch was observed (F(1,45) = 12.6, p = 
.001, partial η² = .22, p(H1|D)>.65), but not for the no touch condition (F(1,45) 
< 1, p = .737, partial η² < .01, p(H0|D)>.86)1.  
In addition, the overall analysis of the LPC showed significant main effects 
of both observed touch (F(1,45) = 44.4, p < .001, partial η² = .50, 
p(H1|D)>.99) and observed hand (F(1,45) = 4.6, p = .037, partial η² = .09, 
p(H1|D)>.58). This reflected the findings that touch on observers’ hands evoked 
greater negativities when viewing touch than no touch in this time range, and 
 
1 Unlike the earlier somatosensory component P45, LPC was maximal over central electrodes (see Figure 2). 
Therefore, we also tested for effects of observed touch, observed hand and their interaction over these 
electrodes (ipsi and contralateral FC1/2, C1/2, CP1/2, and midline FCZ, CZ and CPZ), and found the same 
significant main effects and interactions as in the analysis of the lateral electrodes. 
Bodily self-relatedness in vicarious touch 
 
20 
the finding that touch evoked somewhat greater overall negativities when 
human hands than rubber gloves were viewed.  
 
3. 2. Correlational analyses 
We wanted to investigate whether vicarious touch for self-related stimuli 
(human hands) was systematically mediated by perspective taking / mentalising 
and interoceptive abilities. Vicarious touch was taken to be the difference 
between touch and no-touch conditions where this was more or exclusively 
sensitive to human stimuli. This yielded two vicarious touch variables (vicarious 
touch for human hands over P45 and over LPC). Correlational analyses also 
contained eleven additional variables reflecting perspective taking and 
mentalising, and interoceptive sensitivity and awareness, which are described as 
follows.  
The variable representing perspective taking was the score on the 
perspective-taking subscale of the IRI. This score ranged from 14 to 33 (mean: 
23, SD: 4.7). 
The variable representing mentalising was the average performance on all 
ToM questions (mean: 0.86, SD: 0.13). Accuracy for ToM questions decreased 
with increasing level of representation / intentionality (1st order mean: 1.00; 2nd 
order mean: 0.88; 3rd order mean: 0.81; 4th order mean: 0.76). Performance for 
the 4th-order non-ToM question was similar to that for the 4th-order ToM question 
(0.76). 
The average heartbeat perception score across the two instances of the 
heartbeat counting tasks became the variable representing interoceptive 
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sensitivity. Participants’ average heartbeat perception score was .76 (SD: .14), 
similar to typical samples in the existing literature (e.g., Pollatos et al., 2008). 
The final eight variables represented interoceptive awareness in line with 
the eight dimensions of the MAIA. Average scores on these eight MAIA 
dimensions were as follows: noticing: 3.24 (SD: 1.02), not-distracting: 2.00 
(SD: 0.86), not-worrying: 2.52 (SD: 0.98), attention regulation: 2.99 (SD: 
0.64), emotional awareness: 3.45 (SD: 0.86), self-regulation: 2.86 (SD: 0.98), 
body listening: 2.16 (SD: 1.12), trusting: 3.65 (SD: 0.95), similar to a 
normative student sample (Bornemann, Herbert, Mehling, & Singer, 2015). 
We found that vicarious touch effects for human hands over both P45 and 
LPC positively correlated with the attention regulation dimension of the MAIA 
(P45: r = .44, p = .002; LPC: r = .39, p = .0082). Only the P45 statistic survived 
correction for multiple correlations (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). In other 
words, individuals who scored higher on regulatory aspects of interoceptive 
awareness showed more evidence for vicarious representations of self-related 
(human hand) touch at early sensory processing stages. This relationship is 
depicted in Figure 4 below. Vicarious touch did not correlate with any other 
dimension of the MAIA (r < .27, p > .070), or with interoceptive sensitivity (r < 
.10, p ≥ .519). Vicarious touch was also unrelated to IRI perspective taking (r < 
.10, p > .528) and to mentalising as measured in the ToM task (r < -.07, p ≥ 
.628).     
---------------------------- 
Figure 4 here 
 
2 A correlation of the mirror touch effect for human hands over central electrodes where LPC was maximal 
(ipsi and contralateral FC1/2, C1/2, CP1/2, and midline FCZ, CZ and CPZ) showed similar findings (r = .37, p = 
.012). 
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---------------------------- 
4. Discussion 
The present study aimed to elucidate the neuronal indices of bodily self-
relatedness during vicarious touch. Self-relatedness was manipulated by 
investigating vicarious touch during the observation of human hands (high self-
relatedness) and rubber gloves (low self-relatedness), and measured as 
individual levels of interoceptive awareness, interoceptive sensitivity and 
mentalising abilities in perspective-taking and theory of mind tasks.  
 
In line with our expectations, self-relatedness was associated with 
vicarious touch effects (significant voltage differences during touch versus no 
touch observations) at somatosensory component P45 (35-55 ms). More 
specifically, we found that vicarious touch effects were selective for human 
stimuli, such that significant differences between touch and no-touch conditions 
at P45 occurred only when observing human hands but not when observing 
rubber gloves. Also in line with our expectations, these effects were stronger for 
individuals with higher interoceptive awareness (attention-regulation dimension).  
At later, more cognitive processing stages (LPC, 220-380 ms), vicarious 
touch was found to be sensitive to (but not selective for) human stimuli, as 
larger differences between touch and no-touch stimuli were present for human 
hands than for rubber gloves. This late vicarious touch effect for human stimuli 
was also tendentially related to interoceptive awareness, but this relationship 
was not strong enough to survive multiple-test correction.  
Bodily self-relatedness in vicarious touch 
 
23 
Vicarious touch effects for human hands (P45 or LPC) did not correlate 
with interoceptive sensitivity as measured by a heartbeat counting task, or with 
perspective taking or mentalising scores. 
 
Our present study confirms the hypothesised tight relationship between 
vicarious touch and self-relatedness at P45 (Adler et al., 2016). In other words, 
the mirroring simulation of seen touch only occurs at P45 if the touched stimulus 
can be related to one’s own bodily self, and this effect is larger in individuals 
who are more interoceptively aware. This is in line with earlier findings showing 
that prerequisite embodiment and the observation of highly self-related stimuli 
(touch on own face; Adler et al., 2016; anatomically matched touch on hands in 
first-person perspective; Rigato et al., 2019), are associated with vicarious touch 
effects over P45 specifically. P45 originates in S1 (Allison et al., 1989; 1992; 
Schubert et al., 2008), which is itself critically involved in vicarious touch for 
hands in first-person versus third-person perspectives (Schaefer et al., 2012) 
and in the sense of body ownership (Aspell, Palluel, & Blanke, 2012; Otsuru, 
Hashizume, Nakamura, Endo, Inui, Kakigi, & Yuge, 2014).  
 
Unlike these early processing stages, vicarious touch effects at later 
processing stages (LPC) were not limited to self-relatable stimuli, although there 
were larger vicarious touch effects for self-related stimuli (human hands) than 
for non-self-related stimuli (rubber gloves). This pattern is reminiscent of our 
previous study (Adler et al., 2016), where we found differential vicarious touch 
for self and other faces over P200. A similar effect at P300 was also reported by 
Deschrijver et al. (2015), who demonstrated larger interactions between seen 
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finger movements and felt touches on observers’ fingertips when observers 
viewed a human hand than when they observed a wooden hand.  
Modulations of P200/P300 have repeatedly been linked to self-relatedness 
or self-other distinction in ERP studies (e.g., Adler et al., 2016; Deschrijver et 
al., 2015; Longo et al., 2012; Knyazev, 2013; Zhou, Zhang, Tan & Han, 2004). 
For example, larger P300 amplitudes have been shown for self-referential stimuli 
such as one’s own name or face (see Knyazev, 2013). Given their timing, it is 
likely that our pattern of LPC effects reflects higher-order, cognitive 
representations of the self, which involve body recognition, affective 
categorisation and memory updating (e.g. Briggs & Martin, 2009; Ninomiya, 
Onitsuka, Chen, Sato & Tashiro, 1998; Paul, Endrass, Kathmann, & Simon, 
2016; Polich, 2007; see also Deschrijver et al., 2015), rather than sensorimotor 
embodiment.  
However, effects at these processing stages (P200/P300) are also typically 
associated with congruency effects (mismatches between information from 
different modalities; e.g. Kok, 2001; Polich, 2007; see also Deschrijver et al., 
2015). Indeed, an explanation in terms of visual-tactile mismatches would be in 
line with our findings of larger LPCs during the observation of no touch (vs. 
touch), which differs from the observer’s own experience of touch on their own 
hand. Nonetheless, we show that these LPC differences for touch and no touch 
were stronger during the observation of human hands than rubber gloves, and 
this suggests that effects other than congruency modulate cortical processes in 
this time window.  
In sum, while mismatch or congruency effects may contribute to ERP 
amplitude differences at this processing stage, the findings in their entirety can 
only be explained by invoking operations related to differentiation between self 
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and non-self sources of stimulation. Future studies should target the influence of 
congruency effects on self-non-self distinction (see e.g. Deschrijver et al., 2015, 
for an example). 
 
Our results demonstrate the tight relationship between mirroring 
processes and self-relatedness at early, implicit stages of somatosensory 
processing. This is further substantiated by our observed correlation between 
P45 vicarious touch for human hands and the attention regulation dimension of 
interoceptive awareness. Attention regulation requires controlled switching of 
one’s attentional focus toward one’s bodily sensations, and is therefore 
considered to be a key aspect of mindfulness (Hölzel, Lazar, Gard, Schuman-
Olivier, & Vago, 2011; see also Bornemann et al., 2015; Mehling et al., 2012; 
Mirams, Poliakoff, Brown, & Lloyd, 2013). Our study contributes to this literature 
by showing that individuals with better interoceptive abilities, specifically the 
ability to sustain and control attention to bodily signals, also have stronger 
vicarious representations of observed touch within somatosensory cortices. 
Depersonalisation, which is characterised by a disrupted relationship with the 
bodily self, is also marked by altered attentional processing, and it has recently 
been shown that these alterations occur at early cortical processing stages 
(Schabinger, Gillmeister, Berti, Michal, Beutel, & Adler, 2018). This indicates 
that alterations in the sense of bodily self might be accompanied by alterations 
in the ability to selectively allocate attention to bodily or environmental stimuli. 
Future studies should investigate this in more detail; such endeavours might 
also help to further our understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
interoceptive awareness. 
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Better interoceptive abilities might also entail a stronger sense of the 
difference between self and non-self sources of stimulation (self-other 
distinction). In line with this, we found a hint for a positive relationship between 
attention regulation and self-specific vicarious touch at processing stages related 
to self-other distinction (LPC). However, the relationship between our sense of 
self and vicarious representations is likely to be stronger at early sensorimotor 
stages of embodiment (e.g., as reflected at P45) than at later, cognitive 
representations of the self (e.g., as reflected at P200/P300/LPC). This is because 
our sense of self is primarily bodily (Blanke et al., 2015; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 
2010; Legrand, 2006; Rochat & Striano, 2000). 
We propose that our correlational findings can be explained in terms of 
matching incoming information to pre-existing internal representations. 
Individuals with a stronger sense of self may be better at mapping observed 
self-related (human) touch stimuli onto predictive bodily event templates. It has 
previously been suggested that individuals with better interoceptive abilities are 
less susceptible to body ownership illusions (e.g. rubber hand illusion) because 
such individuals have better predictive models of self-related bodily experiences 
(Tsakiris et al., 2011; for a recent review see Porciello, Bufalari, Minio-Palluelo, 
Di Pace, & Aglioto, 2018). If incoming tactile information can be optimally 
accommodated, there is less reliance on visual information, and less 
embodiment of a rubber hand. A stronger sense of bodily self similarly explains 
the lower susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion in individuals with low levels 
of depersonalisation compared to high levels of depersonalisation (Kanayama, 
Sato, & Ohira, 2009). 
The links between embodiment and interoception are not altogether 
straightforward, however. In addition, the relationship between interoceptive 
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sensitivity (accuracy) and interoceptive awareness remains to be clarified. We 
found that vicarious touch correlated with interoceptive awareness, but not with 
interoceptive sensitivity. This is in line with Mehling et al.’s (2012) finding that 
feelings of dissociation from one’s bodily self relate to lower interoceptive 
awareness (specifically attention regulation), while interoceptive sensitivity does 
not differ between patients with depersonalisation and healthy controls (Michal 
et al., 2014; but see a case study by Sedeño  et al., 2014). Further, mind-body 
training can improve individuals’ interoceptive awareness, but not their 
interoceptive accuracy (e.g. Khalsa, Rudrauf, Damasio, Davidson, Lutz et al., 
2008; but see also Filippetti & Tsakiris, 2017).  While more comprehensive 
studies on their differences are warranted, the evidence presently suggests that 
interoceptive awareness may necessitate more embodiment than interoceptive 
sensitivity. 
In sum, the strength of vicarious representations for self-related bodily 
events appears to co-vary with a prerequisite attachment to one’s bodily self. 
Our findings suggest that this relationship primarily manifests at an early, 
implicit stage of processing, associated with primary somatosensory component 
P45. This relationship may be formed at an early developmental stage, where 
the self can be characterised as sensorimotor-affective rather than as cognitive. 
 
4. 1. Limitations 
Can our findings be unequivocally interpreted as genuine effects of vicarious 
touch? We have previously argued (Adler et al., 2016) that our paradigm 
minimises attentional differences between touch and no-touch conditions by 
presenting maximally similar attention-directing cues in both touch and no touch 
conditions (see also Gillmeister, 2014; Rigato et al., 2019). Since visual 
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perceptual, and therefore also attentional, differences between experimental 
conditions can never be completely eliminated, however, it remains a possibility 
that diverging effects of independent unisensory visual activity contribute to our 
findings. Future studies could control for any residual effects of concomitant 
visual ERPs on somatosensory responses, for example by comparing visual-
tactile trials with additionally presented visual-only trials (see Sel, Galvez-Pol, & 
Forster, 2014; Galvez-Pol, Calvo-Merino, Capilla, & Forster, 2018; Arslanova, 
Galvez-Pol, Calvo-Merino, & Forster, 2019). While visual ERP contamination is 
least likely for early component P45, it is of concern for subsequent 
somatosensory components (N80, P100, N140), the timing of which overlaps 
with visual C1 (75ms), P1 (100ms) and N1 (135-150ms) component responses 
to images (see Pratt, 2012). 
In addition, future studies might wish to target the neural sources of P45 
vicarious touch effects. In the present study, the topographic distribution of 
early cortical vicarious touch effect for human hands was similar to that of the 
P45 component, suggesting that this effect derives from the same cortical source 
(S1). However, our study only recorded from a limited number of scalp locations 
centred on somatosensory cortex, in line with our directed hypotheses for P45, 
and this precludes a neural source analysis. Future studies should investigate 
whether vicarious touch effects at P45 can be ascribed to S1 by recording from a 
more extensive number of scalp locations and performing neural source 
analyses. 
Unlike previous studies (Bolognini et al., 2013, 2014; Gazzola et al., 
2006; Martinez-Jauand et al., 2012; Schaefer et al., 2012), we found no 
evidence for a positive link between vicarious touch and individuals’ perspective 
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taking / mentalising abilities. Since perspective taking is a cognitive measure of 
empathy (e.g., Davis, 1983), it may be presumed that previously reported 
associations result from feedback from later, cognitive processes rather than 
affecting S1 embodiment directly. This complexity might mean that such links 
are not invariably found in measures of S1 processing. The inconsistency in 
findings may also represent limitations in the way that perspective taking tends 
to be measured (as a personality trait rather than a state of mind). Lamm et al. 
(2011) reported that trial by trial affective ratings predict pain-related empathic 
cortical activations more sensitively than trait questionnaires. Future studies 
might further elucidate the links between empathy and vicarious touch by 
employing state measures, or by investigating the relationship between 
perspective-taking / mentalising abilities and vicarious touch in response to 
more interpersonal stimuli such as faces instead of hands.  
 
4. 2. Summary and conclusion 
This study has shown that vicarious touch and the bodily self are tightly linked at 
early, implicit stages of somatosensory processing. P45 vicarious touch appears 
to strongly depend on one’s attachment to one’s own body. In our previous 
study we found that individuals who feel detached from their own bodily self 
(depersonalisation) did not show the self-specific P45 vicarious touch effects 
seen in typical observers (Adler et al., 2016). The present study extends this 
finding by showing that these P45 effects only occur for stimuli that can be 
related to one’s own body (human hands vs. rubber gloves) and are positively 
related to individual levels of interoceptive awareness. We also confirm that 
early, implicit processes are more relevant for experiencing an attachment to 
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one’s own body than later processes, by showing that vicarious touch at later 
processing stages (LPC) was less selective for the type of stimulus (human 
hands vs. rubber gloves). In conclusion, we suggest that the degree to which 
external events are experienced as self-related strongly depends on our 
embodiment of the self at early, implicit stages of somatosensory processing. 
Vicarious processes at P45 can be characterised as a neural basis for these 
experiences. We propose that vicarious processes and the embodied self may be 
representationally indistinct (linked in a common neural representation) at early, 
implicit somatosensory processing stages, which may have very early 
developmental origins in the ‘pre-reflective’ sense of bodily self, the emergence 
of which is driven by mirroring interactions with primary caregivers (Gallese & 
Sinigaglia, 2010; Legrand, 2006; Rochat & Striano, 2000). 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1. Examples of touch and no touch trials for human hand and rubber 
glove conditions, showing stimulus timings.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Topographic maps of average voltage distributions with contralateral 
electrodes displayed in left hemispheres, ipsilateral in right hemispheres. 
Electrodes entered into analyses on the basis of the presence and size of 
components are marked in white. Top panel shows scalp distributions of 
maximum positivities in P45 (left panel) and LPC (right panel) time windows 
(collapsed over all conditions). Middle and bottom panels show scalp 
distributions of maximum differences between touch and no-touch trials in the 
same time windows for human hand (middle panel) and rubber glove (bottom 
panel) conditions. For P45, difference waves were calculated by subtracting no-
touch from touch waveforms; for LPC, they were calculated by subtracting touch 
from no-touch waveforms (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Somatosensory ERPs in response to touch on participants’ hands over a 
contralateral (top panels) or ipsilateral (bottom panel) cluster of electrodes 
(average of FC5/6, FC3/4, C5/6, C3/4, CP5/6, CP3/4). Somatosensory 
component P45 and the LPC are indicated. Asterisks denote significant 
differences between conditions in which touch (black lines) versus no touch 
(grey lines) was viewed on a human hand (left panels) or rubber glove (right 
panels). 
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Figure 4. Scatterplot showing the relationship between individual levels of 
interoceptive awareness (attention regulation dimension) and vicarious touch for 
human hands over P45 (P45 amplitude in touch trials minus P45 amplitude in 
no-touch trials). The central line represents the linear regression line that best 
fits the data points (least squares method), while the outer lines represent the 
95% confidence interval. 
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